in practice, china has developed a unique institutional mechanism for the appointment of judges in district courts. the substantive decision-making power over the appointment of vast majority of judges is controlled by the internal court and party leadership group at the same level, while the authorities outside the court and higher-level courts are only involved in the appointment of court's leadership. the appointment standards mainly focus on professionalism, but also include leadership ability. with respect to the appointment procedure, a diversified and limited competitive appointment pattern has been developed. from the perspective of effects, this appointment mechanism is fairly economic and usually able to select the judges and court leaders with certain professional and leadership capacities. however, it also has relatively obvious problems. the formation of this institutional mechanism is primarily related to the holistic cadre appointment system and the process of judicial construction in china. viewed as a whole, the current reform of provincial court's unified control over the appointment of judges in district courts is able to solve to a certain extent the problems of “localism” or even “mountain-stronghold mentality” and “protectionism” in the appointment of judges (presidents) of district courts, but may have the deficiencies of relatively low information-gathering capability and high appointment cost. “limited centralization and hierarchical authorization” is an effective reform strategy that can both solve the above problems and give consideration to the basic starting point of the reform of the mechanism for the appointment of judges in district courts.